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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
DEDUCTIBILITY OF KICKBACKS UNDER § 162(c)(2)
I. INTRODUCTION
The "public policy" doctrine, now codified in § 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code, disallows deductions for bribes, kickbacks, and other il-
legal payments, lobbying expenses, fines and penalties, and treble damage
payments under the antitrust laws. The doctrine, promulgated in the
courts before the policy sections of the statute were enacted, rests on a
compromise between the goal of taxing net rather than gross income,
and that of avoiding the appearance of subsidizing illegal activities
through tax deductions. Under that policy, expenditures recognized as
ordinary and necessary business expenses are nonetheless denied deduc-
tion because they are illegal or closely connected with illegal activity.
In general, critics of the public policy doctrine say that it perverts the
policy of -taxing only net income and that it involves the Internal Revenue
Service in the enforcement of laws outside its domain.1
This- note is confined to arguments showing that the public policy
doctrine with regard to commercial bribes and kickbacks2 is even more
1 See, e.g., Crouter, Revenue Act of 1971 Restricts Deduclionj of Illegal Bribes, Kickback:
and Referrals, 48 Los ANGELES B. BULL., Jan. 1973, at91; Diamond, The Relevance (or
Irrelevance) of Public Policy in Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions, 44 TAXiS 803
(1966); Ellis & Beck, New Law Clarifies Treatment of Pines, Penalties, Bribes and Antitrust
Payments, 32 J. TAXATION 276 (1970); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitatilon on Deduc.
tions From Gross Income: A Conceptual Analysis, 43 INDIANA L. J. 406 (1968); Koster,
Fines, Kickbacks, and Illegal Business Operating Expenses: When Are They Deductible?, 3
TAXATION FOR AccoUNTANTs 340 (1969); Linsday, Tax Deductions and Public Policy, 41
TAXES 711 (1963); Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing De.
ductions, 1954 SO- CALIF. TAX INST. 715; Reid, Disallowance of Tax Deductlions on Grounds
of Public Policy-A Critique, 17 FED. B. J. 575 (1957); Schwartz, Business Expenses Con.
trary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 TAX L. REV. 241 (1953); Taggart,
Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAX L. REV. 611 (1970);
Van Alstyne, Jr. & Bdrton, Income Tax Litigation: The Arena for Morals?, 38 NED, L. REV.
692 (1959); Note, Public Policy and Federal Income Tax Deductions, 51 COLUM, L. RV.
752 (1951); Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy, 72 YALE L1.
108 (1962).
2 Payments made to domestic or foreign governmental oflicls are specifically excluded from
the scope of this note. Commercial bribery is the payment of money to an agent or employee
of another, made without the principal's knowledge or consent, with the intent to influence
the agent's or employee's action in relation to his principal's business. Bribes and kackbacks
are to be distinguished from rebates, which are discounts who:;e benefit the principal receives,
and from tips, which are kept with the principal's consent to augment a small wage,
Commercial bribes have been made by all kinds of sellers (of meat, varnish, soap, ship
supplies) to all kinds of buyers (chefs, foremen, purchasing agents, ship captains). Their
form and degree vary from twenty-dollar cash payments to Christmas gifts of Wyeth originals
and weekend trips to lavish estates. A recent estimate puts the annual flow of commercial
bribes at five billion dollars: ten times the loss to business from shoplifting. The cost of a
kickback is passed on first to the buyer and ultimately to the consumer in the form of higher
purchase prices or inferior grades of merchandise.
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confused in its formulation and cumbersome in its application than it
is with respect to other expenses similarly denied deduction. None of
the Supreme Court cases in which the public policy doctrine was devel-
oped outline reasons for disallowing the deduction of kickbacks except in
dictum. An examination of these dicta reveals that reasons for including
illegal payments within the class of expenses denied deduction under
the public policy doctrine are questionable. These apparently conflicting
dicta could have been reconciled by a reasonable and narrow reading
which would have confined the disallowance of kickback deductions for
policy reasons to those payments previously found illegal by a state or
federal nontax agency. Instead, courts in cases since Commissioner v.
Sullivan3 and Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissionert have generally
assumed the burden of determining whether a taxpayer's questionable
payments were illegal as a first step in determining tax liability. A sur-
vey of cases decided since 1958 demonstrates that the assumption of this
task as a part of tax litigation has introduced complex problems of con-
struction of nontax statutes, of allocation of the burden of proof of guilt
under nontax statutes, and of duplication of the enforcement policies of
nontax agencies.
These problems have arisen solely because illegal payments, unlike
fines, penalties, or treble damage payments under the antitrust laws, are
usually denied deduction at a pre-enforcement stage, when there has
been no determination that the taxpayer has violated any law. Principles
of intergovernmental comity as well as the practical problems of deter-
mining guilt within the process of tax litigation suggest that the disal-
lowance of deductions for kickback payments for public policy reasons
should be confined to those cases in which the payments have already
been found illegal. This limitation would bring the treatment of illegal
payments under the public policy doctrine into line with the treatment of
fines and penalties as well as conforming to a permissibly narrow read-
ing of the public policy dicta in Sullivan and Tank Truck.
Versions of § 162(c) (2) passed in 1969 and 1971 parallel the sug-
gested limited doctrine with respect to kickbacks and the cumbersome
one developed by courts, respectively. The latter statute, besides pre-
serving a policy which would better be limited or abandoned, is cast in
The financial and moral costs of widespread commercial bribery are discussed in J. FLYNN,
GRAFT IN BusNEss (1931); N. JASPAN & I1 BLAcK, THE THIEF IN THE WHITE COLLAR
(1960); Stevens, Some Economic Consequences of Commercial Bribery, 7 HARV. BUS. REV.
156 (1929). These works paint a distressing picture of how pervasive commercial bribery is.
rax Court and Federal Trade Commission reports provide detailed accounts of the bribery prac-
ices of some individual businesses.
3 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
4 356U.S. 30 (1958).
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such vague and confusing language that taxpayers may now find it harder
to predict the tax status of their illegal payments than they did before the
public policy doctrine was codified.
II. THE FORMULATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DOC RINE
As IT RELATES TO KICKBACKS
The Supreme Court cases which established the public policy doctrine'
throw no direct light on the deductibility of commercial bribes or other
payments made in violation of state or federal law. In Commissioner
v. Heininger,5 attorney fees were incurred by a mail-order dentist in the
unsuccessful resistance of a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General.
In allowing deductions for these fees, the Court said that disallowance
of an otherwise ordinary and necessary business expense was proper only
when allowance would "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies
proscribing particular types of conduct." In Lilly v. Commissioner,7 an
optician paid kickbacks to the ophthalmologist who had referred patients
to him to have their eyeglasses made. The deduction was allowed be-
cause no applicable state statute made such payments illegal; no public
policy existed which such payments, however reprehensible, could frus-
trate. The taxpayer had only to show that the payments were ordinary
and necessary to be allowed the deduction. The Court's reference to the
public policy expressed in Heininger is stated hypothetically:
Assuming for the sake of argument that, under some circumstances,
business expenditures which are ordinary and necessary in the generally
accepted meanings of those words may not be deductible as "ordinary
and necessary" expenses under § 23 (a) (1) (A) [now § 162(a)] 'when
they "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing par-
ticular types of conduct," . . . nevertheless the expenditures now before
us do not fall in that class. The policies frustrated must be national or
state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration of them.8
In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner" a truck operator was
denied deduction of fines incurred for intentional as well as innocent
violations of a state motor vehicle maximum weight statute. The Court
held that "the test of nondeductibility is always the severity and immedi-
acy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction" 10 and
went on to speak of illegal payments:
5320 U.S. 467 (1943).
o Id. at 473.
7 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
8-1d. at 96-97.
O 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
lo Id. at 35.
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Certainly the frustration of state policy is most complete and direct
when the expenditure for which deduction is sought is itself prohibited
by statute. . .. If the expenditure is not itself an illegal act, but rather
the payment of a penalty imposed by the State because of such an act,
as in the present case, the frustration attendant upon deduction would be
only slightly less remote, and would clearly fall within the line of dis-
allowance."
In Commissioner v. Sullivan,' decided the same day as Tank Truck,
he rental and wage expenses of an illegal gambling operation were held
leductible. Although their payment violated a state statute, no federal
tatutory or regulatory disapproval of these expenses existed, and such
!xpenses were ordinary and necessary business expenses "in the accepted
neaning of the words."' 3 Such deductions were to be permitted "unless
t is clear that the allowance is a device to avoid the consequence of viola-
ion of a law . . . or otherwise contravenes the federal policy expressed
n a statute or regulation."'14 On the surface the statements of Tank
rruck and Sullivan relating to payments prohibited by state law seem to
:onflict, or at least to leave undetermined the circumstances under which
i payment made in violation of a state law will be disallo~ved as a de-
luction. These opinions speak of public policy, as it affects the deduct-
bility of illegal payments, outside the context of the facts of the cases
Jecided. Dictum has followed dictum, and the more the Supreme Court
aas said about public policy in general, the less clear public policy as to
dckbacks in particular has become.
Section 162(c) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code was added by the
rax Reform Act of 1969.1' It provided for the nondeductibility of il-
legal bribes or kickbacks to persons other than governmental officials only
if the taxpayer was convicted in a criminal proceeding, or entered a plea
)f guilty or of nolo contendere in such a proceeding. Since the enforce-
ment of state commercial bribery statutes is lax, and since most federal
prohibitions of commercial bribery are administrative rather than criminal,
this provision had the effect of exempting illegal bribes and kickbacks
from the public policy doctrine and allowing their deduction upon a
11 Id.
12 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
13 Id. at 29.
14 Id.
15 Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b) provides:
If in a criminal proceeding a taxpayer is convicted of making a payment (other
than a payment described in paragraph (1)) which is an illegal bribe or kickback,
or his plea of guilty or nolo con:endere to an indictment or information charging
the making of such a payment is entered or accepted in such a proceeding, no de-
duction shall be allowed under subsection (a) on account of such payment or any
related payment made prior to the date of the final judgment in such proceeding.
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showing that they were ordinary and necessary. The Revenue Act of
1971 repealed that subparagraph retroactively and substituted the pres-
ent § 162(c) (2),10 which disallows the deduction of payments made in
violation of (1) any federal law or (2) any state law which subjects the
taxpayer to a criminal penalty or a loss of license, if that law is generally
enforced. This statute appears to be more coherent, comprehensive, and
direct than the Supreme Court opinions that formerly provided indirect
policy statements on the subject of commercial bribes. Nevertheless, ob-
jections arise. First, this most recent addition 17 to the class of expendi-
tures against public policy does not really represent the most complete
and direct kind of frustration of state policies, even though Tank Truck
appears to say it does. Second, the statute, while providing a uniform
source of authority for tax litigation, also broadens the means by which
state and federal policy are to be implemented-so much so that it ex-
tends tax enforcement beyond the scope of the policies it allegedly serves.
A. The Degree to Which Kickbacks Frustrate the Public Policy as
Formulated in Tank Truck
According to Tank Truck, the frustration of public policy is most
complete and direct when the payment made in its violation is itself il-
legal. On its face, this statement means that illegal bribes and kick-
backs, however ordinary and necessary, constitute that form of expendi-
ture public policy doctrine finds most heinous. But because a payment
is illegal is not the only, or even the best, reason for denying its deducti-
bility. When the agency charged with assessing an income tax distorts
the net income formula upon which that tax is based, it ought to do so
only because of the most pressing requirements of avoidance of conflicts
with the policy of its own or other gpvernmental branches. Thus, the
deduction of fines and penalties is disallowed because another state or
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c)(2) provides:
No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any payment (other than a
payment described in paragraph (1)) made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if the
payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, cr other illegal payment under
any law of the United States, or under any law of a State (but only if such State
law is generally enforced), which subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the
loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or business. For purposes of this
paragraph, a kickback includes a payment in consideration of the referral of a client,
patient, or customer. The burden of proof in respect of the issue, for purposes of
this paragraph, as to whether a payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kick-
back, or other illegal payment shall be upon the Secretary or his delegate to the
same extent as he bears the burden of proof under section 7454 (concerning the
burden of proof when the issue relates to fraud).
17 Act of December-30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(a) added § 162(f) and § 162(g)
of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, which disallow the deduction of fines and penalties, and of
two-thirds of treble damage payments incurred under the antitrust laws, respectively,
[Vol. 35
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Federal enforcement agency that levied the fine has already determined that
the taxpayer has violated some public policy. The deduction of bribes
nd kickbacks to government officials is denied because of the duty the
Internal Revenue Service owes to itself and other branches not to help
subsidize their corruption. No such direct governmental action against
Lhe taxpayer himself, or such overriding governmental interest in the
recipient of the payment, justifies the disallowance of a deduction for
kickbacks in the absence of a previous governmental determination of the
taxpayer's guilt.
Only a handful of federal income tax cases in which the deductibil-
ity of a commercial bribe or illegal payment was in question were pre-
-eded by any nontax agency's direct action against a specific taxpayer's
illegal payments.18 The only case decided before Tank Truck and Sulli-
van in which a state enforcement agency had found a taxpayer's pay-
ments to have violated a state statute is Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc.19
The taxpayer-insurance broker had split policy-writing commissions paid to
it by insurance companies with auto dealers from whom it had received
referrals of auto purchasers in need of additional insurance. An Illinois
law provided that only parties licensed by the state could receive insur-
ance commissions, and an inquiry into the taxpayer's payments to the un-
licensed auto dealers was followed by a hearing and the issuing of an offi-
zial reprimand by an administrative agency of the State of Illinois. The
taxpayer was not fined, nor was his license suspended. The Tax Court
18 In G. E. Fuller, 20 T.C. 308 (1953), aff'd 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954) and Hiram
E. Bowles, 1954 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 510 taxpayers bought and sold liquor in violation of state
statutes. Each was raided by police who seized his liquor stock and never returned it, although
in Fuller no charges were mentioned and in Bowles the state case against the taxpayer was dis-
missed for lack of evidence. Both taxpayers were denied loss deductions for the confiscated
liquor on the grounds that since the purchase of liquor for purposes of resale was illegal, the
xpayers could have no property interest in the liquor and therefore had suffered no loss when
it had been seized. These cases are confusing because the taxpayers were allowed to include
:he cost of unconfiscated liquor in cost of goods sold, the goods being liquor in which, ac-
:ording to the Tax Court's reasoning, the taxpayers also had no property interest, so that they
could have had no expenses in acquiring something they did not own, nor a cost of goods
;old for something which was not theirs to sell.
In Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. 422 (1967) the taxpayer, a record manufacturer and dis-
tributor, was denied deductions for the payola money he had paid to disc jockeys in violation
Df the New York commercial bribery statute. No state criminal charges had been filed against
the taxpayer, but two of the disc jockeys who had received payments had been indicted under
that statute and one of them had pleaded guilty. The Tax Court rejected arguments that, since
the taxpayer itself had not been charged under the New York statute, it was nor within the
province of the Tax Court to decide that the taxpayer had violated that law, and the deductions
should therefore not have been denied. The court held that the presentation of the public
policy question made it incumbent upon the Tax Court to determine whether the taxpayer
had violated the statute in order to decide whether a frustration of state policy had occurred,
.ven if no state court or other state authority had made such a determination.
19 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
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disallowed the deduction of $23,908.90 paid to unlicensed auto dealers
in 1948 and $46,085.28 paid in 1949.
Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. is the only case cited in Tank Truck
in support of its statement that "[c]ertainly the frustration of state policy
is most complete and direct when the expenditure for which deduction
is sought is itself prohibited by statute.' °2 0 The citation of this case, unique
even since Tank Truck in the history of the public policy doctrine, raises
doubts about the scope of the statement it supports. A permissibly
narrow reading of the Tank Truck policy statement would be that pay-
ment for which deduction is sought can be found to be prohibited by
statute only when a state or federal agency outside the tax system has
made a pri6r determination of the taxpayer's guilt. This reading would
help to reconcile Tank Truck with the apparently contradictory result in
Sullivan. While rent and salary expenses of illegal gambling opera-
tions such as the Sullivans' are costs whose payment was forbidden by
Illinois law, no mention is made of any determination by a state en-
forcement or other nontax agency that the taxpayer had violated that
law. So distinguished, the Boyle and Sullivan illegal payments can rea-
sonably receive different tax treatment under the public policy doctrine,
as in fact they did.
Under this reading, the apparent scope of 'rank Truck's public policy
statement on illegal payments diminishes sharply, since only one case
could be found to which it applied. At the same time the statement gains
credibility through its limitation: when a governmental agency has pre-
viously found a taxpayer guilty of making an illegal payment, that tax-
payer has been found to have violated public policy completely and
directly before the question of a tax deduction even arises. Such a find-
ing by a nontax agency is a specific expression of governmental policy to
which, like the levying of a fine or penalty, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice can most properly demonstrate intergovernmental comity through
denial of a deduction. Such a denial is more appropriate than one made
in the absence of any previous finding of guilt, just ai the denial of a de-
duction for fines and penalties is proper only when fines have actually
been exacted.
Only one court since Tank Truck has explicitly read the public policy
doctrine to apply so narrowly to illegal payments. In Kirtz v. United
States,21 the insurance agent-taxpayer had kicked back portions of his
policy-writing commissions to a finance company subject to an arrange-
ment similar to that in Boyle. During a general investigation of insur-
20 356 U.S. at 35.
21 304 F.2d 460 (Ct. C1. 1962).
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ance practices, the Internal Revenue Service discovered that the taxpayer
and other insurance agents were paying rebates for new business, that the
payment of such rebates was widespread, and that their payment violated
Ohio law. When the Ohio Department of Insurance was notified of
these infractions, it took no action against the taxpayer and did not even
tell him to refrain from making his illegal rebates. In tax litigation be-
fore the Court of Claims, the Internal Revenue Service invoked the vio-
lated Ohio law and the public policy doctrine, citing Tank Truck, Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. United States,"2 Heininger, and Boyle. The court
allowed the deduction on the ground that, since no state determination
of the taxpayer's guilt had -been made, no public policy which his own
payments violated had been articulated:
The Boyle case, and every case relied on by the defendant, contained
an element lacking in the present action; i.e., a determination by the
authority charged with the enforcement of the state or federal law or
the carrying out of the public policy involved that the expense for the
deduction sought was incurred in violation of that law or well-defined
public policy. Lacking any such determination, we are of the opinion
that an allegation by the Internal Revenue Service that the expense was
incurred in violation of a state statute is insufficient to disallow an other-
wise proper deduction unless the expense occasioned an act mahn in re.
To permit the Internal Revenue Service to employ Federal tax law in an
effort to enforce its concept of state law as the Service views it would
be an unnecessary extension of its delegated authority, at the very best,
and creates a disruptive atmosphere of interference by the Federal Govern-
ment in an area traditionally reserved to the states. Inasmuch as the
Ohio Superintendent of Insurance was apprised of the activities herein
discussed and did not determine that a well-defined public policy was
being violated, we are of the opinion that neither the Internal Revenue
Service nor this court should provide that determination.23
In other words, a complete and direct frustration of state policy does not
occur whenever an illegal payment has been made, but only when a state
authority has declared that its policy has been violated by an individual
taxpayer.
B. Implementation of the Public Policy Doctrine as
Formulated in Tank Truck
Unfortunately, Sullivan's characterization of the payments whose de-
ductibility was in question as legal expenditures of an illegal business,
rather than as payments themselves forbidden by law, means that the
22356 U.S. 38 (1958) (a companion case to Tank Truck in which fines paid for inadvertent
violations of motor vehicle weight law were denied deduction).
23304 F.2d at 463.
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public policy doctrine expressed in Tank Truck and in Sullivan was for-
mulated absent any direct determination of an illegal payment. The
reliance on dictum required by such an omission has understandably led
to judicial and statutory confusion. While a reading of the Tank Truck
statement on illegal payments as narrow as the one suggested above might
have been applied, cases since Tank Truck and Sullivan show that courts
have read the public policy doctrine as it applied to illegal payments to
allow a much broader application of the public policy doctrine to pay-
ments not .previously held illegal. The result has been the gradual inter-
jection of the complexities of a criminal trial into federal income tax liti-
gation.
1. Avoidance of the Public Policy Doctrine
One approach to an increasingly complex doctrine has been to avoid
its construction altogether by finding that payments are not ordinary or
necessary on non-public policy grounds. Two tax court cases illustrate
this approach. First, in Sanford Reffet 24 a deduction was denied for con-
tingent witness fees paid in an action for damages to the taxpayer's bus,
iness. While no state statute specifically forbade such payments, they
were void as against public policy. The court held, however, that the
tax deduction need not turn on public policy grounds because such pay-
ments were not the "common and accepted (ordinary] means used by a
coal operator or any other person in prosecuting an action for damages
to his business."2 In the following year, in Frederick Steel Co.,20 a fin-
ished steel jobber was denied a deduction for kickbacks to a customer's
purchasing agent. In response to an officer's testimony that he knew of
many such arrangements, the court said: "Such self-serving, unconvinc-
ing testimony falls far short of establishing that payments in the nature
of commercial bribes were common [ordinary[[ in this segment of the
steel industry. -2 7 Likewise, in United Draperies, Inc. v. Commissioner"8
the Seventh Circuit denied a deduction for kickbacks paid to vice-presi-
idents of the trailer manufacturing companies the taxpayer supplied. The
court recognized that kickbacks occurred but said they were not an ordi-
nary means of securing or promoting business.
Despite these courts' denial that any public policy issues had arisen,
the tone of their opinions suggests that they were moved by considera-
24 39 T.C. 869 (1963).
25Id. at 878.
2642 T.C. 13 (1964), revd on other grounds, 375 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1967).
27 42 T.C. at 25.
28 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.), af'g 41 T.C. 457 (1964).
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tions of legality or morality in refusing to find that the taxpayers' ex-
penditures were ordinary. The outraged disbelief with which they re-
ceived claims, even testimony, of widespread illegal payment practices,
had the effect of increasing the taxpayers' burden of providing that such
payments were ordinary and necessary. Moreover, the courts' explicit
refusal to consider the illegality or immorality of the payments meant
that this added burden of proof had been imposed in the absence of any
finding, even one made in the course of tax litigation, that the taxpayers
had in fact violated state law.
2. Construction of Statutes Which Prohibit Certain Payments
Courts that do apply the public policy doctrine to payments of ques-
tionable legality have found that, since no previous determination of guilt
has been made, they must construe state or federal law to determine
whether a violation, and thus a frustration of public policy, has oc-
curred.21
In Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Wrorks, Inc. v. United States,"0
the ship chandler-taxpayer's questionable payments were kickbacks paid
to captains and engineers of foreign ships. Louisiana's commercial brib-
ery statute forbade the making of such payments without the knowledge
29 In United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir), rev'g 1 AFTR 2d 644 (N.D.
Dkla. 1958), the taxpayer tried to deduct the cost of four cases of liquor he had purchased
for business entertainment use in his home. While purchase and possession of liquor for per-
.onal use were permissible in Oklahoma, a state statute made it unlawful for anyone to sell,
barter, give away, or otherwise furnish liquor. The district court allowed the deduction, say-
*ng that the statute prohibited only giving away liquor as a subterfuge for an illegal sale, and
fhe legality of possession of liquor for personal use was not limited to liquor used for personal
:onsumption only.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that personal use included only purely social, nonbusi-
Less entertainment, so that the taxpayer's distribution of liquor to his business guests was illegal.
Although no statute forbade the purchase of the liquor, the court denied the deduction of its
:ost because the expenditures were made for an illegal purpose, whose accomplishment re-
iuired the commission of illegal acts by the taxpayer's vendor in addition to the taxpayer's
legal distribution. Thus state law had been violated in acts closely connected with the legal
purchase, and the court held that "the severity of the frustration is not diminished by the fact
hat the purchase violated no Oklahoma law. The immediacy of the frustration is shown by
he fact that a law violation directly preceded and directly followed the expenditure claimed
o be deductible." 261 F.2d at 679. To this statutory hodgepodge the dissent added one
?iquant detail: in more than fifty years of prohibition in Oklahoma, no criminal charges for
;erving liquor to business guests in private homes had.ever been reported. The dissent also
'ointed out that it is difficult to see how severely and immediately a violation of a law which
ias never been enforced can frustrate public policy.
The taxpayer in Al l. Smith, 33 T.C. 861 (1960) also attempted to deduct the cost of liquor
erved to his- business guests. One Mississippi state law prohibited the sale, possession, and
;iving away of any intoxicating liquors; another levied a tax on the sale of all illegal com-
nodities, providing an important source of Mississippi revenue from taxes on liquor sales.
7he Tax Court found that these apparently conflicting statutes established a sharply defined state
olicy which the taxpayer's purchasers had frustrated and violated, and denied the deduction.
30 315 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963), afg 207 F. Supp. 84 (E. D. La. 1962).
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and consent of the payees' employers. Affidavits from seventeen foreign
shipowners stated that the owners either did not know of the practice of
paying kickbacks, or knew of the practice but vigorously objected to it.
The kickbacks were held illegal under the Louisiana statute, and the
Fifth Circuit denied deductions of $41,940.01 for 1951 and of $79,311.43
for 1952.
In Coed Records, Inc.31 the record manufacturer-taxpayer claimed that
its payola payments to disc jockeys did not violate the New York com-
mercial bribery statute which forbade making such payments without
knowledge and consent of the payees' employers. It said that the mak-
ing of payola payments was so widespread that the station owners' con-
sent could be inferred. The Tax Court held that not even the showing
of a widespread payola practice could establish owners' knowledge and
consent, and that, even if it could, such a showing had not been made
by the taxpayer. The record company's payments were held illegal under
the New York commercial bribery statute and their deduction was de-
nied.
The taxpayer in In re Michaud,82 a meat purveyor, had paid kick-
backs of three percent of his gross sales to managers, chefs, and other
purchasing agents of clubs, hospitals, hotels, and similar institutional
customers. The Internal Revenue Service contended that the payments
constituted an unfair or deceptive commercial practice within the mean-
ing of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 192:1 and that they violated
commercial bribery statutes of the states in which the taxpayer conducted
his business. The taxpayer presented no direct testimony about the ex-
tent or the legality of the custom, but cited the Internal Revenue Service
practice of routinely auditing the tax returns of all taxpayers in the
wholesale food industry in the Philadelphia area on the grounds that the
custom of paying kickbacks was widespread and that a formula for dis-
allowing the deduction of twenty-five to fifty percent of all claimed pro-
motion expenses had been adopted. The district court found this evidence
of Internal Revenue Service policy inconclusive on the question of the ex-
tent of the practice of paying kickbacks. In addition, the taxpayer had
submitted no testimony to show that the payments had been made with
the payees' employers' consent, a necessary element in showing the pay-
ments to be legal under the bribery statutes and therefore deductible. The
court concluded that the taxpayer "failed to carry his burden of proof as
3147 T.C. 422 (1967).
32 317 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.
1972).
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to the knowledge of the employers of the recipients, or custom of the in-
dustry." 3 The deductions were denied.
3. Shifting the Burden of Proof in Determining the
Taxpayer's Guilt
The courts that assumed the task of construing state criminal law in
federal income tax litigation have encountered problems unforeseen in
Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. and Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. The first
difficulty is that while taxpayers bear the burden of proof in demonstrat-
ing that they are entitled to deductions, the prosecution bears the burden
of proving the defendant guilty of commercial bribery at a state crimi-
nal trial. In the hybrid process of guilt determination and tax litigation
undertaken in the cases discussed above, the prosecutog's burden of prov-
ing guilt under the criminal charge diminishes and even disappears. In
Coed Records and Michaud the burden of proof was effectively shifted:
the Internal Revenue Service presented no evidence of the taxpayers'
guilt except for the invocation of the commercial bribery statutes that
might have been violated. The taxpayers were left to prove their in-
nocence as an element of their proof that they were entitled to a deduc-
tion. This change apparently took the taxpayers in Coed Records and
Michaud by surprise; according to this more stringent standard their evi-
dence was ill-prepared indeed. But the shift of burden has unfortunate
consequences: many taxpayers who could not be convicted in a state
criminal proceeding could nevertheless be held to have violated a com-
mercial bribery statute for federal income tax purposes only. This tax
practice contravenes state policy by distorting the process through which
state law, and hence public policy, are determined to have been violated.
How this contravention constitutes enforcement of state policy under the
public policy doctrine is difficult to see.
One court has addressed this problem indirectly. In Conway Import
Co. v. United States, 4 the taxpayer, a wholesale purveyor of condiments
to institutional food customers, paid kickbacks to chefs and stewards in
circumstances identical to those in Michaud. The district court, finding
that the kickbacks had been paid in a secretive manner to ensure continu-
ing purchases, nevertheless held that
It does not follow that the payments were necessarily violations of the
statutes against commercial bribery.... [The statutes in question] ex-
tend their prohibitions only to payments made without the knowledge
of the employers. There is some indication that gratuities such as here
33317 F. Supp. at 1009.
34311 F. Supp. 5 (F.D.N.Y. 1969).
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involved were a matter of common knowledge in the industry. The
court in a tax case should not pass on matters which would be defenses
in a criminal prosecution.8 3
The court also concluded that the evidence presented by the taxpayer,
including a citation of Internal Revenue practices (similar to those re-
ferred to in Michaud) and. testimony by Conway's president that the
payment of kickbacks was customary in the trade (similar to the evidence
rejected in Frederick Steel Co.), satisfied even the "unnecessarily hostile"
standard of Michaud and proved the payments were ordinary and neces-
sary. The deductions were allowed because of this proof and because
the applicable state statutes were "in a state of innocuous desuetude" or
had been "strictly construed."
The public policy doctrine, expressed in Tank Truck and Sullivan,
and under which the opposite results in Michaud and Conway were
reached, does not mention the burden of proving criminal guilt in tax
litigation; Tank Truck's reliance on Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. limits
its direct applicability to cases in which a determination of guilt has been
made prior to litigation of the tax issues. Tank Truck can be read as
implying that such cases are the only ones involving kickbacks to which
the public policy doctrine should be applied and in which deductions of
kickbacks should therefore be disallowed. However, no such explicit
limitation was made. As a result the incorporation of aspects of a state
criminal trial into federal income tax litigation, with all its attendant
difficulties of construing state statutes and of determining guilt under an
ill-defined burden of proof, has been continued since Tank Truck through
the series of cases discussed above.
4. Examination of the States' Enforcement Policies
As an Element of Public Policy
Some courts have been unwilling to find a frustration of public policy
when the taxpayer's expenditures have violated "dead-letter" laws, such
as the liquor laws under which the deductions claimed in Winters and
Al J. Smith 3 were denied. They became mired in yet another problem
concerning state enforcement policy, that of the record of enforcement of
the state statutes whose violation was claimed to frustrate public policy.
As the dissent in Winters pointed out, the zeal with which state enforce.
ment agencies prosecute violations of illegal payment statutes is itself an
expression of those states' public policy. In Stacy v. United States7 a
35 Id. at 16.
36 See note 29 supra.
37 231 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Miss. 1963).
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contractor claimed deductions of $1,038.92 for purchases of whiskey used
in business entertainment. In construing the conflicting Mississippi stat-
utes under which the possession and sale of liquor are illegal and the
purchase of liquor is taxed, the district court concluded that the prohibi-
tion law was directed at persons engaged in the whiskey business rather
than private purchasers. It then construed state policy as evidenced by the
levying of a tax on all whiskey purchases to approve the purchase of
liquor so long as all state revenue requirements were fulfilled and held
that "ft]he State has the undoubted power to collect a tax on a business
which it condemns and makes illegal but in so doing it just as surely
blurs its focus upon any declaration of public policy contained in such
a mixed-up scheme."3 Since the taxpayer's purchases complied with all
state revenue policies, no public policy had been violated. The public
policy evidenced in the prohibition statute, under which the taxpayer in
Al f. Smith had been denied a deduction three years before, was under-
cut by the enforcement of a conflicting statute as well as by a newly of-
fered construction of the prohibitory statute itself. The public policy doc-
trine required federal revenue policy to conform to state policy, if it re-
quired anything at all, and the deduction was allowed.
-In Matt R. Kane,39 a companion case to Conway, the Tax Court al-
lowed the deduction of a condiment purveyor's kickbacks to chefs and
stewards. An Illinois commercial bribery statute prohibited such pay-
ments, but the court held that the payments had not violated public policy
for federal income tax purposes because the state had neither taken any
action against the taxpayer nor prosecuted anyone else, despite the wide-
spread nature of the illegal practice. In this case the narrow reading of
Tank Truck, as construed in Kirtz, required the same result as did the
complicated process of determining public policy as outlined in the cases
discussed above. The Tax Court relied heavily upon Kirtz' authority to
find, without approaching the question of the taxpayer's guilt, that
since no prior determination of guilt had been made no public policy
issue arose. The court's mention of lack of general state enforcement
also linked the case with the cumbersome process that had evolved since
the incorporation of guilt determination into tax litigation: the interpre-
tation of a state policy that may never have been declared (through con-
struction of a statute under which few cases may have been brought),
the determination of taxpayer's guilt under standards of proof which may
not have been articulated, and the sporadic examination of a state's en-
forcement policies in accordance with public policy theories of a federal
381 d. at 306.
39 1971 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 987.
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court. The respective results of adopting the narrow and the complex
constructions of the public policy doctrine would not be the same for
every taxpayer, but enforcement of both federal' and state41 bribery laws
has been so lax that a court which did choose to examine enforcement
40 The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1971) provides in pertinent
part:
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
Bribery is held to constitute an unfair means of competition because of the unfair advantage
the bribing seller secures over his nonbribing competitor in the agent's decisions to buy.
From its inception in 1914 until the early 1920's the Commission issued about a hundred
cease and desist orders against payors of commercial bribes. Three court decisions narrowed
the scope of its activity. New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 26t4 F 509
(2d Cir. 1920) held that gratuities of gifts and entertainment paid to customers were "an
incident of business from time immemorial" which did not affect the public interest, and thus
were not an unfair means of competition. Kinney-Rome Cc. v. Federal Trade Commission,
275 F. 665 (7th Cir. 1921) held that giving small presents to department store salesmen,
with their employers' consent, for every sale of the donor's product did not injure competitors
whose producti were sold in the same stores, and thus was not a means of unfair competition,
Winslow v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 F. 206 (4th Cir. 1921) held that a Norfolk ship
chandlers sales to English ships docked in Norfolk did not constitute interstate commerce,
even though the chandler had bought many of his supplies outside Virginia. Thus the appel.
lant was not engaged in interstate commerce and was not subject to control by the Federal
Trade Commission. This decision virtually exempted the ship chandlery industry from con.
trol by the Commission.
After 1923 the issuance of cease and desist orders declined sharply, not to be revived until
the disc jockey payola scandals broke in 1959 and the Commission issued about sixty cease
and desist orders against record manufacturer-payers of payola. The complaints were later dis.
missed when it was established that recent amendments to the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. § 317 (1971) fully protected the public interest.
Regrettably, Federal Trade Commission activity in the area of commercial bribery has once
again ceased. The Federal Trade Commission Act would seem to be a better vehicle than the
state criminal laws for controlling commercial bribery. Since the Commission has broad In-
vestigative powers, it could find out what practices exist on an industry.wide basis. Since Its
strongest sanction is the cease anddesist order which can be appealed to a federal court of ap.
peals, investigations might meet with less resistance than a criminal procedure would, and the
Commission. could even engage in cooperative efforts with industries to stop the flow of kick.
backs their members often unwillingly pay. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE
CoMiISSION (1924); Note, Commercial Bribery, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1928); Note,
Bribery in Commercial Relationships, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248 (1932).
Other federal statutes forbid commercial bribery; See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1350 (1965).
Emphasis is given to the Federal Trade Commission Act here because it is the statute the In.
ternal Revenue Service has most frequently chosen to revive and enforce in the name of public
policy.
41 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 180 (McKinney 1967) provides:
A person is guilty of commercial bribing when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer,
any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's employer
or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's
affairs.
This statute and its predecessor are the model state commercial bribery statutes. Note,
Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REV, 848
(1960) tabulates the state commercial bribery statutes then in force (only thirteen states had
general statutes similar to New York's) and points out that even under the most actively en-
forced state law (New York's) only seven criminal charges hd appeared in the reported cases
as of 1960.
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policy would tend to allow the deduction of illegal kickback payments for
a large proportion of those taxpayers whose guilt had not been previously
determined. If the results are to be the same, the former, simpler process
is preferable.
If the public policy doctrine with respect to kickbacks and other illegal
payments, as enunciated in Tank Truck and Sullivan, forbade the denial
of deductions only where a lirior determination of guilt had been made,
it was so poorly articulated that the litigation of all subsequent kickback
cases except Kirtz occurred pursuant to a mistaken reading. If the public
policy doctrine required complicated statutory construction and a deter-
mination of guilt within the federal income tax system, it was at best care-
less and mistaken in its invocation of these requirements in contrast to
the doctrine that applied to all other expenditures against public policy.
In either case, judicial or statutory clarification was needed.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS UNDER § 162(c) (2)
The narrow reading of the Tank Truck and Sullivan dicta on illegal
payments can be viewed as the source of the 1969 version of § 162(c)
(2) That provision required the payer's conviction or plea of guilty
or of nolo contendere in a criminal proceeding before the payment would
be deemed illegal and its deduction disallowed. Section 162(c) (2) was
the most narrow reading of the public policy doctrine yet to appear, since
under its standards even th -payments in Boyle, found illegal in a state
administrative proceeding, would not violate public policy. Like the nar-
row reading of the Tank Truck dictum it would have kept federal income
tax litigation free from the determination of a 'taxpayer's guilt under
laws outside the Internal Revenue Code. The provision was also desir-
able in that it aligned the treatment of kickbacks with that of all other
expenditures against public policy (except bribes paid to government
officials) by keeping the scope' of the disallowance of deductions con-
fined to those instances in which an individual taxpayer had been found
to have violated policy by an enforcement agency of the government
which had expressed the policy in the first place.
The statute also dried up the flow of revenue from the disallowance
of deductions for kickbacks by allowing their deduction by most, if not
all, taxpayers: in all the kickback cases reported before its enactment no
taxpayer had been indicted in a state criminal proceeding.
The Senate Finance Committee said it had become
concerned that these provisions .. .unduly restrict the denial of de-
ductions.... The committee continues to believe that the determination
4 2 See note 15 supra.
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of when a deduction should be denied should remain under the con-
trol of Congress. However, the committee concluded that the area in
which deductions are denied should be expanded somewhat beyond the
limits set in 1969. 43
The resultant 1971 revision of § 162(c) (2)' " is the provision in force
today. For the deduction to be denied, the taxpayer need only be sub.
ject to, not convicted of or even indicted under, a statute that provides
for criminal penalty or loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade
or business. This abandonment of the 1969 statute's requirement of con-
viction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere permits the reintroduction
of the hybrid process of guilt determination in tax litigation as devel-
oped in the cases decided before its passage.
To prevent denial of deductions to those taxpayers whose payments
violated "dead-letter" statutes, such as those in Al J. Smith and United
States v. Winters, the state law (because of whose violation the deduction
is denied) must also be "generally enforced." To prevent the effective
shift of the burden of proof of innocence to the taxpayer, the existing
provision puts the burden of proof of state statutory violation upon the
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. These two protective mea-
sures are intended to curb the abuses previously present in those cases in
which courts declined to examine the enforcement record of a statute, or
in which the taxpayer was required to prove his innocence to secure a
deduction for a questionable payment. But the protection they offer
operates in an uncertain and cumbersome fashion that makes the 1971
provision unsatisfactory in principle as well as in practice.
A. The Requirement That State Statutes Be "Generally Enforced,"
The requirement of a conviction or of a plea of guilty or nolo con.
tendere in the 1969 law meant that the state's policy under its illegal
payment statutes would (or should) already have been ascertained for
the taxpayer whose deductions were in question. The present law's re-
quirement of general enforcement of a state statute does not speak to the
status of the taxpayer at all, but only to the general status of the law
under which the payments are questioned. The requirement of general
enforcement as it evolved in cases like Stacy v. United States and Matt
R. Kane served the purpose of broadening the factors to be considered in
construing a state statute beyond the language of the statute itself. Al-
though this additional inquiry improved and refined the construction pro-
cess, its inclusion in the 1971 Revenue Act has an undesirable side effect:
43 S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1971).
44 See note 16 supra.
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allows the Internal Revenue Service to exercise discretion in defining
ie scope of its enforcement of state statutes in a manner which may
iolate, rather than serve, a state's policy with respect to that law.
No matter how generally enforced a state statute is, some taxpayers
'ho violate the statute will not be convicted under it. Their escape from
ie legal consequences of their violations may be due to various factors:
iadequate state enforcement, insufficient evidence against taxpayers, or
Kercise of the state's discretion not to prosecute. Under the present
Prsion of § 162(c) (2) the Internal Revenue Service may nevertheless
rove such a taxpayer's guilt under the statute and deny the deduction of
payment only it has determined illegal.
A state's practical inability to enforce its own statute has regrettably
een seen as all the more reason for the Internal Revenue Service to
elp with the punishment of offenders. In G. E. Fuller, where the cost
f illegally purchased liquor subsequently seized by state police was held
ondeductible, the Tax Court said, "only lack of complete administra-
on of the existing statutes prevented petitioner from losing the whiskey
ae moment he was found with it in Oklahoma."45 But is not the weak-
ess of a state's enforcement efforts itself an expression of public policy?
'he finding of guilt in a federal income tax proceeding and the denial of
deduction within the federal income tax system does not reflect a per-
iissible form of federal aid to inadequately financed and staffed police
epartments, but rather preemption and distortion of a state's enforce-
ient policies.
If a state cannot gather sufficient evidence to convict a taxpayer who
as made illegal payments, the Internal Revenue Service's access to that
erson's tax returns and the confidential information they contain may
-sult in a determination of guilt which could not have been indepen-
ently made by a state agency. Whether the use of such information,
those introduction into a state proceeding might not be allowed, en-
Drces state policies regarding a defendant's procedural protections is
uestionable. And if a state in the exercise of its discretionary powers
hooses not to prosecute a taxpayer for the making of even clearly il-
gal payments, the determination of guilt and the denial of deduction
rithin the federal income tax system can only contravene or frustrate
ie state's public policy.
The general enforcement requirement could also act to allow deduc-
ions for payments which are abhorrent to state policy. If a notorious
ixpayer has been convicted of commercial bribery in an isolated state
45 20 T.C. at 318.
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trial, his payments might be deductible because the law under which
he was convicted was not generally enforced.
This replacement of the requirement of state action against an of-
fender before a deduction can be denied with the requirement that the
statute be "generally enforced" not only frees the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to disallow deductions to taxpayers not previously found guilty,
but also absolves the Service from the requirement that it show any rela-
tion between the class of taxpayers convicted or reprimanded under state
law and the class of taxpayers to whom it denies deductions for illegal
payments. In other words, the Internal Revenue Service may evolve a
discretionary enforcement policy that not only fails to coincide with, but
may even contradict, the discretionary policy of the state. The equiva-
lent of this power in the area of fines and penalties is officious intermed-
dling at best. If a state could not or would not enforce its motor vehicle
maximum weight statutes, and from information given on a taxpayer's
return the Internal Revenue Service was able to calculate that the tax-
payer had violated those statutes, the public policy doctrine as regards
fines and penalties would not permit the Service to disallow deductions
of the fines which would have been exacted had the state held the tax-
payer in violation of the law. Such an excursion into hypothetical state
law enforcement is hardly demanded ih the name of comity, yet its coun-
terpart is allowed for the denial of deductions of commercial bribes and
kickbacks. because of the words "generally enforced." This unique ju-
risdiction to preempt, distort, and even contradict state enforcement policy
on illegal payments seems an inappropriate means for implementing a
tax doctrine whose justification lies in the necessity to conform to public
policy as expressed by a state.
Although the words "generally enforced" do not provide protection
from the denial of a deduction for any taxpayer or class of taxpayers, they
may be seen as an effective general limitation of the denial of deduc-
tions. Since the lack of general enforcement of a state statute precludes
the disallowance of the deduction of a payment forbidden by that stat-
ute, and since enforcement of state commercial bribery statutes is so
sporadic as not to constitute "general enforcement" in the usual sense of
those words, a blanket allowance of deductions under § 162 (c) (2) seems
appropriate.
The words "generally enforced" have not yet been judicially con.
strued so that the frequency with which state statutes will be found to
have been generally enforced, and hence to be appropriate bars to deduc-
tions claimed under § 162(c) (2), is as yet unknown. "Generally en-
forced" could reasonably be construed to mean any degree of law en-
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forcement between (but not including) the extremes of "dead-letter"
status and that of the specific state action taken against the taxpayer in
Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. or required by the 1969 version of the §
162(c) (2). Since this range of permissible interpretations remains
great, it is difficult to predict which statutes will be found not "generally
enforced," and hence it is difficult to predict which classes of taxpayers
will be provided with a blanket exemption from the public policy doc-
trine through the subsequent allowance of deduction of their illegal
payments.
Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18(b) (3) provides that a state
law
shall be considered to be generally enforced unless it is never enforced
or the only persons normally charged with violations thereof in the
State (or the District of Columbia) enacting the law are infamous or
those whose violations are extraordinarily flagrant. For example, a
criminal statute of a State shall be considered to be generally enforced
unless violations of the statute which are brought to the attention of
appropriate enforcement authorities do not result in any enforcement ac-
tion in the absence of unusual circumstances.46
The regulation provides for so broad a reading of "general enforcement"
that almost any activity would constitute general enforcement.
The exclusion of laws never enforced from the definition of general
enforcement does prevent the denial of deductions for payments pro-
hibited by "dead-letter" statutes. The exclusion from that definition of
laws invoked only against infamous offenders or those whose violations
are flagrant may raise more problems than it solves, since enforcement of
state commercial bribery statutes, at least, is so infrequent that any per-
son brought to trial for their violation becomes notorious. Further, this
part of the definition seems to allow the deduction of illegal payments by
some infamous and notorious offenders, since the laws under which only
they have been charged are those which by definition are not generally
enforced. At the same time, such deductions would be denied to the
most retiring and discreet offenders-those against whom no state ac-
tion had been taken-if the laws in whose violation their payments
have been made have been generally enforced.
The exclusion from the definition of "generally enforced" of stat-
utes whose reported violations result in no enforcement action by ap-
propriate authorities appear to be a codification of the facts and holding
of Kirtz v. United States. There the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance
took no action against or even notice of the taxpayer's illegal rebates
4 0 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)(3), 37 Fed. Reg. 25937 (1972) (emphasis added).
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even' after he had been informed of their payment. In support of its
allowance of the deduction of these payments, the Court of Claims
said that the allowance for deductions of illegal payments extends to
all cases in which no state action, such as the administrative reprimand
referred to in Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, has previously been taken against
the taxpayer. The Kirtz pattern is used in the proposed regulation to
promulgate a policy under which no deduction of illegal payments is
allowed unless a stite enforcement agency, notified of statutory viola-
tions, nevertheless fails to take any action against the offenders. This
example describes a "dead-letter" statute which, in addition to being de-
funct, has received official burial.
If the Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18(b) (3) is meant to
illustrate the term "never enforced," the example goes beyond any com-
mon understanding of that term's meaning of a "dead-letter" statute
which enforcement authorities have allowed to lapse or failed to en-
force in the normal course of their duties, toward the meaning of. a law
which enforcement agencies have positively refused to enforce at all. If
all laws except those which are "never enforced" under this extremely
narrow standard are "generally enforced," then taxpayers may be denied
deductions for payments illegal under statutes which are "dead-letter"
laws in the ordinary sense, such as liquor laws under which the deduc-
tions in United States v. Winters and Al J. Smith were denied. Thus
the apparent protection which § 162(c)(2) offers by the words "gen-
erally enforced"-that of forcing a court to examine the enforcement
record of an illegal payment statute before denying a deduction for a
payment made in its violation-may be no protection at all. If "not
generally enforced" means something so narrow as "not enforced against
the taxpayer in question when his violations were brought to the atten-
tion of enforcement authorities," then the taxpayer's payments in Kir/z
are the only ones in the illegal payment cases decided until now whose
deductions would be allowed under the present statute.
The definition of "generally enforced" in Proposed Treasury Regu.
lation § 1.162-18 (b) (3) may not operate so broadly as to deny almost all
deductions; but the manner in which the regulation interprets the statute
and in which the example illustrates the regulation make it difficult to
predict the status of any taxpayer under § 162(c)(2). That section de-
fines the taxpayer's status in terms of enforcement of the state statute
alleged to have been violated. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.162-
18(b)(3) in turn defines and illustrates the enforcement status of the
state statute in terms of its past application, without specifying how a
state's failure or refusal to take action against an individual taxpayer
[Vol. 5
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whose deductions are questioned will affect him for federal tax purposes.
Hence, it is at present virtually impossible for a taxpayer to determine
whether his illegal payments are deductible. This lack of any predict-
able relation between the enforcement of a state statute and the denial
of deductions for illegal payments as they affect individual taxpayers
is in sharp contrast to the manner in which the denial of deductions for
fines and penalties operates under the public policy doctrine. It also
casts doubts upon the degree to -which state policy is actually intended
to be enforced under § 162(c) (2) and the proposed regulation; the
criteria of § 162(c) (2) as defined by the proposed regulation may al-
low federal income tax policy not only to exceed the requirements of the
public policy doctrine but to act completely independently of them. This
disjunction is indefensible in terms of the public policy doctrine require-
ment that the net income basis for taxation be distorted only for press-
ing reasons of intergovernmental comity.
Even if Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18(b) (3) articulates
a definition of "generally enforced" that conforms to requirements of the
public policy doctrine, it does so in terms capable of differing interpre-
tation and hence leaves unresolved the scope of § 162(c) (2)'s applica-
tion. For how long must a statute, once actively enforced, be allowed to
sink into disuse before it can be considered "never enforced"? What sort
Df offender will be treated an "infamous" person or one "whose viola-
tions are extraordinarily flagrant"? What constitutes a violation of the
statute brought to the attention of appropriate enforcement authorities?
If the Internal Revenue Service reports what it believes to be a violation
)f a state illegal payment statute and no enforcement action follows, the
state enforcement agency may have determined that no violation has oc-
-urred under its interpretation of the statute, or it may have believed
that a violation took place, but declined to enforce the statute. Only in
:he latter case would state law be held not generally enforced for pur-
poses of § 162(c) (2), but silence and inaction by the state enforce-
nent agency would leave undetermined which conclusion had been
"eached.
What constitutes an enforcement action which would show the law
:o be generally enforced? The issuing of a reprimand without fine or
oss of license which preceded Boyle, the seizure of goods illegally pur-
:hased as in G. E. Fuller, the bringing of a case later dismissed for lack
)f evidence as in Hiram E. Bowles, or the indictment of the taxpayer's
ayee as was done in connection with Coed Records, Inc., might or might
lot constitute enforcement action whose occurrence renders a state stat-
ite "generally enforced" and thus a source for disallowance of illegal
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payment deductions claimed by other taxpayers against whom no en-
forcement action had been taken, pursuant to the definitions in Proposed
Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18(b) (3).
One writer has said that the proposed regulation's definition of "gen.
erally enforced" as meaning anything beyond no enforcement at all
shifts the burden of proof to the taxpayer. 7 Section 162(c) (2) puts
upon the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate the burden of proof
of guilt under the state statute which the taxpayer's payments are alleged
to have violated. The burden of proving the allowability of a deduc-
tion claimed under § 162 (c) (2) remains, however, on the taxpayer. If
the words "generally enforced" add an element to the steps necessary in
the construction of state law, as did the examination of enforcement
policies in the cases decided before the enactment of § 162(c) (2), the
Government's burden of proving guilt means that the very looseness of
the terms used by the proposed regulation in its definition of "generally
enforced" offers defenses behind which 'the taxpayer can entrench him-
self. The only burden left for the taxpayer to bear would be that of the
nuisance of preparing claims that the statute under which his deductions
have been disallowed has never been enforced, that other offenders against
whom enforcement action has been taken are notorious or their violations
flagrant, that "violations" brought to the attention of state enforcement
agencies were not violations at all, or that the action taken by the en-
forcement agencies did not constitute enforcement action.
If, on the other hand, the words "generally enforced" operate only
to define the scope of § 162(c) (2) in its disallowance of deductions,
then the burden of proving deductibility which remains on the taxpayer
requires that he prove those claims which need only be asserted if those
words are ones of construction.
Neither § 162(c) (2) nor Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18
(b) (3) assigns the burden of proving that a state statute is "generally
enforced." Even if that burden is the taxpayer's, the terms of the defini-
tion offered in the proposed regulation provide a framework for proving
claims that a state statute is not generally enforced which are more de-
tailed and helpful in the preparation of a taxpayer's claim than the words
"generally enforced" alone.
No cases have as yet been reported under § 162(c) (2).48 When
47 Meltzer, Are Proposed Kickback Regulations an Unwarranted Extension ol the Code?, 38
J. TAXArON 166, 168 (1973).
48The issue of its scope has arisen, however. In Raymond Mazzel, 61 T.C. 497 (1974) the
taxpayer was denied a theft loss deduction under § 165(e) for $20,000 stolen by confidence
men after he had contributed it for reproduction in what he believed to be a counterfehling
scheme. The thieves had never intended to reproduce the currency and their sole object was
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cases do arise, and especially if Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18
is adopted, litigants will learn that the words "generally enforced" intro-
duce a jungle of conflicting and vague criteria for determining what state
policy is, and how or whether the public policy doctrine should conform
to it, far more impenetrable than the standards evolved in case law prior
to the passage of § 162(c) (2).
B. Federal Statutes and Public Policy under § 162(c)(2)
No requirement of general enforcement, or of any degree of en-
forcement at all, limits the discretion of the Internal Revenue Service
in its denial of deductions for payments forbidden by federal statutes.
For federal statutes that have not been enforced by the agencies nor-
mally charged with their enforcement, denial of deductions for payments
they forbid does not merely preempt, distort, or contravene public policy
(as it may with regard to state statutes), but creates public policy and
enforces it within the federal income tax system at one stroke.
The systematic creation of public policy by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice can be seen by examining the revenue rulings that promulgate stan-
dards for tax enforcement of federal statutes. The statute most fre-
quently invoked in these rulings is the Federal Trade Commission Act'
forbidding the use of unfair methods of competition, or of unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices, in commerce. Revenue Ruling 54-27 reports
that the Commission had informed the Internal Revenue Service that
under certain conditions the practice by sellers .. .of paying money or
making gifts to employees or agents of customers or prospective cus-
tomers, or to employees or agents of competitors' customers or prospec-
tive customers, is an unfair method of competition in violation of Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended. 51
For a payment to constitute an unfair method of competition, it must
to steal from their victim. The Tax Court denied the loss deduction on public policy grounds
because the payment, although not itself illegal, was so closely connected to an illegal activity
that the allowance of a deduction would "immediately and severely frustrate the dearly de-
fined policy" against counterfeiting United States currency. A dissenting opinion stated that,
since Congress had codified the public policy doctrine in the 1969 and 1971 additions to § 162,
the provisions of that section were intended to be all-inclusive. Therefore Congress had
"intended to remove public considerations from the Internal Revenue Code where not sped-
fically included" or had at least "called for judicial restraint" in areas where deductions were
not specifically limited by public policy statutes.
The majority opinion use of language from the Tank Truck test appears to indicate that
the public policy doctrine as codified in § 162 supplants the previous standards developed by
courts only in the case of expenditures claimed as business expense deductions. The public
policy governing losses will still be found in Tank Truck and the cases which follow it.
40 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1971).
50 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 44.
51Id. at 45.
19741 NOTES
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
have been made for the purpose of influencing the payee, and without
the knowledge or consent of the payee's employer. The Ruling pro-
vides that payments whose legality was questionable according to the
Federal Trade Commission criteria could be deducted if they were nor-
mal, usual, and customary in the taxpayer's business and community-
that is, ordinary; if they were appropriate and helpful in obtaining busi-
ness-that is, necessary; and if they were made with the knowledge and
consent of the payee's employer-that is, not illegal under the second
criterion of the policy of the Federal Trade Commission.
Cases following this ruling involved taxpayers in the ship chandlery
industry, a business whose bribery practices the 'Federal Trade Commission
had sought to control in its first issuance of cease and desist orders forty
years earlier. In Fiambolis v. United States52 a ship chandler's kickback
payments to ships' officers were found to conform to the requirements
for deductibility promulgated by Revenue Ruling 54-27 and thus not to
violate public policy. The kickbacks were also held not to violate the
South Carolina commercial bribery statute since criminal intent on the
part of the taxpayer, required for conviction tinder the statute, was not
shown.5 3
Revenue Ruling 58-47914 acquiesces in ,Valetti and restates the cri-
teria of Revenue Ruling 54-27 with specific reference to the ship chan-
dlery industry alone. It quotes the Lilly pronouncement that ordinary and
necessary payments will be deductible unless they "frustrate sharply de-
fined national or state policy." Cases following this ruling include Dixie
Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States" as well as the
leading cases of Sullivan5" and Tank Truck."'
Revenue Ruling 62-19458 adopts the district court decision in Dixie
Machine and incorporates it into a general summary of tax policy under
federal law. It points out that Dixie Machine's payments were illegal
under Louisiana law because they were made without the shipowners'
52 152 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.S.C. 1957).
53 In Eugene Richardson, 1957 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 439, all'd 264 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1959),
the Tax Court relied on Fiambolis to hold that a ship chandler's kickbacks to captains of for-
eign ships did not violate public policy. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision, but specif-
ically cited Revenue Ruling 54-27 and its criteria as the basis for its holding.
In a third ship chandlery case, Valetti v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1958),
aff'g on this issue 28 T.C. 692 (1957), no public policy issue was raised but the taxpayer's
deductions were allowed, in part because they were found ordinary and necessary according to
tests promulgated in Lilly, note 7 supra.
54 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 60.
55 See note 30 supra.
56 See note 3 supra.
57 See note 4 supra.
58 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 57.
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knowledge or consent, and that shipowners' knowledge and consent con-
stitute one of the conditions under which deductions could be allowed
according to Revenue Ruling 58-479'9 and Revenue Ruling 54-27. The
ruling does not speak of federal statutes except to say that "[m)any
Federal laws and regulations make kickbacks illegal under certain cir-
cumstances and, therefore, they are not deductible where such statutes
or regulations are applicable."'6
The Internal Revenue Service continues to view the ship chandlery
industry with concern. Proposed Regulation § 1.162-18(b) (5) 02 gives
as an example of the application of Proposed Regulation § 1.162-18(b)
a fact pattern identical to that in Dixie Machine except for a changed
date and the amount claimed as a deduction.
Another industry against whose members the Federal Trade Com-
mission had formerly issued complaints is the record manufacturing in-
dustry. Revenue Ruling 62-13313 recalls that on December 6, 1959, the
Commission had issued a news release announcing the filing of numerous
complaints against record manufacturers on the grounds that payola
payments made to disc jockeys restrained competition and deceived the
public thus constituting an unfair business practice under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The complaints were later withdrawn when
amendments to the Federal Communications Act04 appeared to protect
the public interest in radio sponsorship. 5
Revenue Ruling 62-133 declares that the Federal Trade Commission
news release "was an expression of sharply defined Federal policy against
'payola' " and that payola payments made on or after that date there-
fore violate public policy and are not deductible. The deductibility of
payola payments made on or after that date were to be decided on a case-
by-case basis, with deduction denied if the payments were "found to have
frustrated a sharply defined public policy proscribing particular types of
conduct expressed by a particular state' 67 before the news release.
The activity of the Federal Trade Commission in relation to the
ship chandlery and record manufacturing industries was involuntarily
59 See note 54 supra.
60 See note 49 supra.
61 1962-2 GUM. BULL. at 58.
-
2 See note 46 supra.
63 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 45.
6447 U.S.C. § 317 (1971).
65 See note 40 supra.
06 1962-2 CUM. BULL. at 46.
67d. at 46. In Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. 422 (1967), payola payments made in 1958
and 1959 were denied deduction on the latter grounds when they were held to have been made
in violation of New York's commercial bribery statute.
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curtailed, in the former by a now obsolete court construction of what
constitutes interstate commerce, 8 in the latter by statutory usurpation
by the Federal Communications Commission. In both instances the
willingness of the Internal Revenue'Service to formulate and enforce
tax policies which replace Federal Trade Commission activity seems un-
necessary and misplaced. The Commission could easily revive its investi-
gation of the ship chandlery industry, and its failure to do so may itself
be an expression of a public policy of apathy which Internal Revenue
Service denial of deductions for kickback payments distorts. Since the
Federal Communications Commission is now charged with the control of
payola payments, the Internal Revenue Service policy of denying deduc-
tions under now obsolete Federal Trade Commission standards is more.
over at least unnecessary duplication, and .perhaps even enforcement of
a policy which no longer exists. The denial of deductions under § 162
(c) (2) for payments which violate federal laws, without even the mini-
mal requirement that those federal laws be "generally enforced," allows
the Internal Revenue Service to create and enforce federal nontax pol-
icies in what is really a policy vacuum. Section 162(c)(2) allows the
Internal Revenue Service to act as a corpse-reviver for federal policies
which, however laudable at their inception, may now be obsolete or ex-
tinct. Worse, the statute casts the Service as an institutional resurrection
man whose source of revenue is the exhumation of federal statutes clearly
dead and mercifully buried. The requirements of intragovernmental
comity do not call for such a policy and may even reasonably forbid it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tax policy under § 162(c) (2) appears to have spawned a hydra-
headed monster. Good faith enforcement of state and federal policies
through the tax system at the pre-enforcement stage demands an effort
to duplicate those policies and the procedures under which they would
otherwise be enforced. The more care Congress and the Internal Rev-
enue Service exercise to incorporate the protections of a state criminal or
federal regulatory enforcement proceeding into federal income tax liti-
gation, the more complexities arise. Some policy or procedural protec-
tions cannot be duplicated. Apart from .the difficulty of construing state
and federal bribery laws and of applying state enforcement policies or of
even deciding what they are, there remain those elements of state en-
forcement policy present in the number of counts of violations with which
criminal defendants are charged, the possibly unpredictable conviction
patterns of juries, and the discretion judges may exercise in fining or
68 See note 40 supra.
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sentencing offenders, all nuances of policy impossible to duplicate in the
simultaneous determination of statutory violation and federal income
tax liability.
These difficulties in tax policy formulation all stem from the fact
that kickbacks, unlike fines and penalties, are denied deduction at the pre-
enforcement stage. To understand and enforce a state or federal policy
as it might have applied to an unconvicted taxpayer is much harder than
applying it to one who has already been convicted and fined. For this
reason alone, a broad reading of Tank Truck's statement that "the frustra-
tion of state policy is most complete and direct when the expenditure
for which deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute"8 19 seems
wrong. The frustration of public policy is most complete and direct
when a taxpayer has been held by a state to have frustrated its policy--
that is, when he has been convicted in a criminal proceeding or fined
pursuant to some other procedure. Even when this most direct frustra-
tion of state policy has occurred, comity with states' enforcement policies
would seem to demand that only the fine exacted as an expression of the
states' displeasure at their policies' frustration, not the payment which
occasioned the violation of the law, be denied deduction.
The denial of deduction for fines and penalties is often defended on
the grounds that to allow their deduction would lessen the economic
"sting" of the penalty the state inflicts. No such arguments are available
for the denial of deduction to kickback payments, which are not the
economic equivalent of a fine or penalty used to punish an offender, but
represent the cost of committing the crime. State commercial bribery
laws typically provide for fining offenders. A taxpayer who has been con-
victed under such a statute will be denied deduction of the fines assessed
against him, and the further nondeductibility of the illegal payments
themselves adds a second penalty for which state law does not provide.
Denial of deductions for illegal payments made by unconvicted payers
may be a good-faith effort to inflict in duplicate the financial losses which
would have been suffered had the taxpayer been convicted and fined.
However, since the amount denied deduction is the cost of committing
the crime, not the amount of a hypothetical penalty, the amount of the
tax punishment may bear no relation at all to the fine which otherwise
might have been exacted.70  Denial of deductions for payments which
violate federal statutes is even less justifiable for punishment-duplicating
6 9 See note 20 supra.
70Comments, Business Expenses, Disallouance, and Public Policy, 72 YALE L]. 108
(1962) gives an excellent description of the disparity between the severity of the punish-
ment provided for by state and federal illegal payment statutes and that inflicted under the
tax policies formulated to aid in their enforcement.
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reasons, since those statutes often do not provide for the assessment of
any fines at all.
The present version of § 162(c) (2) is a mistake. There are good
reasons for denying deduction to some illegal (and legal) kickback pay-
ments, but the public policy doctrine is not one of them. Kickback pay-
ments can be denied deduction if they are not ordinary and necessary
business expenses (so long as courts abandon the practice of incorporat-
ing public policy criteria into their tests for "ordinary" and "necessary"),
if they have not been sufficiently substantiated under the requirements of
§ 274(d), or if they represent personal rather than business expenses.
These reasons for disallowing the deduction of any claimed business
expense are satisfactory both as reasonable tests for what all business
expenses ought not to be and as a summary of the qualities that are most
offensive about kickbacks.
Renewed enforcement of state and federal commercial bribery stat-
utes by the agencies originally charged with their administration is the
only appropriate means of punishing the payers of kickbacks. The use
of the Internal Revenue Code as an instrument for the enforcement of
nontax laws is distasteful in principle and so complicated in practice that
its abandonment is dictated.
Mary S, Lycan
[Vol, 85
